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Introduction 
This paper provides stylized facts with respect to the relationships among financial 
liberalization, economic growth, stability, and financial market development, with a focus on 
emerging countries and particularly on Latin America and Caribbean countries in the context of 
the increasing use of the domestic currency in emerging markets and the issue of access to 
finance. 
Since the crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s, many emerging market countries have 
directed greater attention and support toward developing domestic financial markets with long-
term view and also to permit access to finance to various segments of the population as well as 
to entrepreneurs in the Schumpeterian sense1. This stance is mainly centered on better prudential 
regulation and professional management of government debt and bonds. It is different from the 
past, when emerging market economies relied on financial liberalization to access foreign rather 
than domestic markets for selected entities including the government, state –owned enterprises 
and big corporations. This new approach significantly changes the impact of financial 
liberalization on economic growth, financial sector development, and vulnerability to financial 
crises. 
The models of economic growth constitute a starting point for the analysis. Solow’s 
model2—in line with the neoclassical view of the loanable theory of funds—does not make 
reference to the role of the financial system and how investments would be financed. By putting 
emphasis on savings and investment, Solow’s model leads to giving the government a bigger 
role, in the sense of justifying the government’s intervention to undertake investments that 
permit the takeoff of the economy and “convergence.” In turn, this type of policy has led to 
central planning and to a number of restrictive measures that go under the term financial 
repression, and also include a great role for state-owned enterprises and publicly owned banks. 
Conversely, following Schumpeter3, the financial system constitutes an essential part of 
development and is instrumental to the deployment of entrepreneurship. The endogenous growth 
                                                 
 Pietro Masci, Director, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Department of the Treasury, Rome, Italy, previously 
Chief Infrastructure and Financial Markets Division Inter-American Development Bank. 
1 According to Schumpeter, Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction Publishers, 1934) the entrepreneur is someone who carries out "new combinations" by such things as 
introducing new products or processes, identifying new export markets or sources of supply, or creating new types 
of organization. 
2 R.M. Solow, R. M.,  “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”,  Quarterly Journal of Economics 70, 
no. 1, 1957, 65–94 and “Technical Changes and the Aggregate Production Function”, Review of Economics and 
Statistics 39, no. 3,1957, 312–20. 
3 Joseph Schumpeter, op.cit..  
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theory and Schumpeter’s work are the basis for policies that allow the private sector and an 
entrepreneur to carry out his or her “innovations,” which are the engine of growth and reduce the 
interference of the government in the economy. The government’s role is to ensure that the 
institutional setting, e.g., property rights and the rule of law do not hamper the positive force of 
entrepreneurship. The evolution towards a more democratic view of access to finance has then 
led among other things to the theory and practice of lending and financing for micro enterprises. 
In this context, financial liberalization represents a key strategy, which has an impact on 
economic growth and development, vulnerability to financial crises, and domestic financial and 
capital market development. This paper proceeds as follows: the next, second section covers the 
definitions of financial repression -with particular attention to the role of public sector banks- 
and liberalization; the third section revisits the issues of economic growth and financial 
liberalization; the fourth section explores the links between financial liberalization and financial 
crises; the fifth section articulates the relationship between financial liberalization and domestic 
financial markets; the sixth section focuses on financial stability and the seventh concludes. 
The figure shows an increasing number of investigations reports during FY2003-FY2007. 
The number of reports for investigations in this period is significantly higher than the number of 
management reports, grant and contract audit reports. The highest increase occurred in FY2007 
when there were 1,006 investigation reports, which represents an increase of 214% in relation to 
FY2006. The number of grant and contract audit reports are second in terms of increasing 
number of reports. They have been modestly growing, reaching their highest number in FY2006 
when there were 304 grant and contract audit reports, which represents an increase of 132% in 
comparison to FY2005. Management reports show a slight variance during FY2003 - FY2007. 
Their highest variance and increase occurred in FY2004 when there were 125 management 
reports which represents and increase of 187% in relation to FY2003.  
 
Financial Repression and Financial Liberalization 
Articulating the characteristics of the government’s intervention in financial markets— 
and particularly the role that public sector banks play in that context—permit us to gain a better 
understanding of the role of financial liberalization. 
 Financial Repression 
 McKinnon4 and Shaw5 pointed out the reality of extensive government interventions—
mostly in emerging market countries—in financial markets. They characterized these 
interventions as “financial repression,” in which the government, in place of the market, makes a 
series of decisions with regard to the 
• Allocation of credit to given “clients”; 
• Determination of interest rates and “interest rate ceilings”;  
                                                 
4 Ronald I. McKinnon, 1973. “Money and Finance in Economic Development”, (Washington: Brookings Institution 
Press, 1973). 
5 Edward S. Shaw, “Financial Deepening in Economic Development” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
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• Mandatory reserve requirement in the amount and type of reserves (e.g., government 
paper); 
• Entry of new institutions into the credit market; 
• Creation of state-owned financial institutions ;  
• Control of the “capital account,” i.e., lending and borrowing abroad are subject to 
specific authorizations. 
In addition to these types of decisions, the government may also—directly or indirectly—
determine several operational aspects of banking activities, e.g., hiring, opening of branches, and 
salaries. 
The practices of government intervention are based on the theory of the “developmental 
state view”6 (Amsden; Wade), which works on the assumption that market failure is pervasive 
and recommends that the government take direct action in financial markets by creating a 
government-run financial sector.7 Hence, government intervention is necessary to mobilize 
savings and to allocate resources efficiently to catch up with developed economies. Wade8 
believes that government intervention increases savings and enables them to be used for 
developmental and industrial purposes. Amsden9 asserts that subsidies are critical to encourage 
investments and also to support export-oriented strategies to deal with currency devaluation by 
competitors and importing countries. The developmental state view gives the government the 
explicit responsibility for resource allocation decisions and was the theoretical basis for many 
government interventions in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The motivation of providing finance for development mainly implied making financial 
resources available for the central government and other related entities.  
Public Sector Banks and Financial Market Development 
Within the scope of government intervention in the economy and as part of financial 
repression, the role of public sector banks constitutes an important instrument that respond to 
failures of private markets of providing financing for economic activities that would lead to 
economic growth. 
Domestic public sector banks are intended to play the role of providing finance for 
development. At the international level, Multilateral development banks (MDBs) – like the 
World Bank- are expected to provide long term financial resources given the low domestic 
savings that emerging countries would not find available in the private international markets.  
                                                 
6 A. Amsden, A, “Asia’s Next Giants: South Korea and Late Industrialization”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989 and R. Wade, “Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization”, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
7Government ownership of banks constitutes a major phenomenon worldwide. In 2000, the average proportion of 
state ownership in the banking industry around the world was about 35 percent. This share was even larger during 
the 1970s, when more than 50 percent of worldwide bank assets were controlled by the public sector. Ideological 
changes regarding the state’s role in the economy, as well as financial crises, led governments to privatize financial 
institutions.  
8 Wade, op cit. 
9 Amsden op. cit. 
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Most of the literature on the state ownership of banks focuses on development and also 
on commercial banks, or a blend of the two. However, these are very different types of 
institutions. Research has shown that state-owned development banks tend to have low 
profitability, and their return on assets tends to be lower than that of private banks. For Latin 
America, this is particularly true in countries such as Guatemala, Chile, Mexico, and Colombia. 
In Brazil and Peru, however, no major difference exists between the profitability of development 
banks and that of private commercial banks (e.g., this could be due to the fact that development 
banks have a lower cost of funds); and in El Salvador and Bolivia, development banks seem to 
be more profitable than private commercial banks. It should be noted that there are 
developmental banks, e.g., Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) that operate effectively. 
Following the work of La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer10, Galindo, Micco, and 
Panizza11 studied public bank performance—including commercial and development banks—
relative to that of privately owned banks. Public sector banks charge lower interest rates than 
their private counterparts (e.g., this is consistent with Sapienza12), and they also pay lower 
interest rates on their deposits (e.g., 90 basis points less than private banks). Public banks tend to 
lend more to the public sector, i.e., the difference between the share of public sector loans of 
private and public banks is 8 percentage points; and they also tend to have a higher share of 
nonperforming loans, i.e., about 8 percentage points. Finally, public banks are less profitable 
than private entities, i.e., the difference in returns on assets is 0.4 percentage points.  
The results presented above should be taken with some caution. They suggest that while 
public sector banks tend to be less efficient than their private counterparts and—with more 
nonperforming loans, more loans to the public sector, higher overhead, and lower returns—they 
are perceived to be able to address in some cases market failures and to be safer (i.e., government 
is the ultimate guarantor), to be able to lend in a countercyclical fashion, and hence to be able to 
pay lower rates on their deposits and extend credit at a lower rate. An alternative explanation is 
that state-owned banks may benefit from indirect subsides coming from government deposits, 
paying low interest rates or no interest. 
 On an efficiency basis, public sector banks—both development banks and commercial 
banks—do not perform as well as private sector banks.13 This is clearly an important limitation 
in that public sector banks do not exercise the function of allocating credit according to 
efficiency criteria, rewarding the “creative destruction” of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, and 
                                                 
10 R. La Porta, R., F. López-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer. 2002. “Government Ownership of Banks”, Journal of 
Finance 57, 2002, 265–301. 
11 Arturo Galindo,  Alejandro Micco and Ugo Panizza. 2005, “Financial Reforms in the 1990s”. (Washington DC: 
Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank, 2005).  
12 P. Sapienza, “The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending”, Journal of Financial Economics 72, no. 
2, 2004, 357–84. 
13 Lending and support to public sector banks that are underperforming relative to private banks is tantamount to 
supporting inefficiencies and allocating credit that does not respond to efficiency criteria. Moreover, the existence of 
large public sector banks has another negative impact on financial market development. The existence of public 
banks requires the national budget to allocate funds to replenish the national development bank and also requires the 
government—or the domestic development banks directly, with the guarantee of the government—to issue bonds on 
the domestic capital market to raise funds.  
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therefore miss opportunities to finance growth. In turn, the presence of public sector banks limits 
the development of a healthy financial market that responds to market prices and incentives.  
From the point of view of political economy, the government’s intervention in financial 
markets favors a number of players—e.g., big companies, state-owned banks themselves, and 
bureaucracy allowing them to have access to finance for developmental purposes—and also sets 
incentives for obtaining jobs in well-paying positions in those banks. In all circumstances, these 
players would resist changes and the elimination of interventions.  
Financial Liberalization 
 Financial liberalization is defined as the removal of government intervention from 
financial markets. Liberalization includes eliminating the restrictions listed in the previous 
section—bank interest rate ceilings; compulsory reserve requirements; barriers to entry, 
particularly foreign financial intermediaries; and credit allocation decisions. These policies 
reduce the government’s interference in financial markets, leading to the privatizing of state-
owned banks; introducing the convertibility of the currency on the capital account (i.e., capital 
account liberalization); improving prudential regulation; and promoting local stock markets. In 
the past three decades, both industrial and emerging market countries have moved toward this 
form of liberalization of their financial systems (see Figure 1, which is from Galindo, Micco and 
Panizza14). 
 Research and experience show that financial liberalization has two main effects, which 
can have both benefits and costs. Liberalization can lead to faster economic growth. But it can 
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Note: The index plots the simple average of liberalization in the capital account, the domestic financial system, and the stock market. This measures ranges from 1 to 3, 
where 3 is full liberalization. The Average Liberalization Index in the graph is the simple average of the liberalization measure across countries in each year. 
Source :Financial Liberalization is based on the indicators developed in Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and authors' updates of this index. 
                                                 
14 Galindo et al. op. cit. 
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also increase the financial vulnerability of a country, even leading to a financial crisis. 
Financial Liberalization and Economic Growth 
The justification for government intervention in financial markets in the forms of 
financial repression and direct intervention through public sector banks - based on their assumed 
market failure- in line with a more or less stringent command economy, is that the government 
can direct resources to encourage the takeoff of the country and concentrate those resources in 
sectors and companies that favor economic growth and development.15  
However, financial repression has several negative effects on economic growth, which 
McKinnon16  and Shaw17, among others, have pointed out: 
• Administrative interest rates would undervalue real interest rates, give an incentive to 
reduce savings and investment, and have a negative impact on the rate of economic 
growth. 
• Individuals would find ways to export capital abroad (capital flight), creating pressure 
on the exchange rate. 
• Administrative determination of credit—not established by the market price—would 
lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. This “bad” allocation would compound 
the negative impact on growth because the most promising investments would not get 
financed and therefore would not contribute to economic growth. 
• Access to credit was granted for developmental purposes to big state owned and 
private companies, while the rest of the economy started to have some access to 
consumer credit. 
 The expected benefits of financial liberalization—and particularly a liberalized capital 
account—are the ability to undertake investments in excess of the level of domestic savings 
(which is especially important for Latin American countries with low savings rates) and finance 
economic growth; the technology transfers associated with foreign direct investment; and the 
increased competition in the financial sector due to the removal of barriers and also as a result of 
the entry of foreign banks. Conversely, the abolition of financial repression and the reduction or 
elimination of public sector banks stimulate competition, and market based allocation of credit, 
domestic savings, investment, and growth.  
Therefore, by favoring financial development, financial liberalization increases the long-
run growth rate of the economy. King and Levine18  link financial market development to the 
insights of Schumpeter19 about the role of finance in encouraging entrepreneurship. 
                                                 
15 Stiglitz argues that the evidence does not support that capital account liberalization prompts economic growth. 
J.E. Stiglitz, “Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth and Instability”, in World Development 28: 1075–
86, 2000. 
16 McKinnon, op. cit. 
17 Shaw, op. cit. 
18 R.G. King, R. G., and R. Levine, “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 108: 717–37, 1993. 
19 Schumpeter, op. cit. 
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The process of liberalization also implies that foreign banks can enter the domestic 
market of an emerging market country by establishing branches as well as acquiring existing 
domestic banks. According to the literature, the entry of foreign banks leads to various positive 
effects, including advances in technology, and ultimately increases competition within the 
financial systems. The entry of foreign banks, particularly in Latin America, has been beneficial 
in many respects. However, it has not improved the overall access to finance for various 
segments of the population, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and 
individuals who want to perform the function of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur (see Claessens, 
Demirgüc-Kunt, and Huizinga20 ; Clarke et al21; and Moreno and Villar22). In some countries 
(e.g., Brazil), public sector banks, such as the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e 
Social (BNDES), perform the function of lending to SMEs (see Morais23). 
On the relationship between financial development and economic growth, McKinnon’s 
and Shaw’s analyses of financial repression as well as the “conditionality” of international 
financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank prompted a 
number of reforms in various countries. However, the expectation that financial liberalization 
would bring competition and access to finance has not fully materialized also considering that 
banks tend to lend to known risks and the various international requirements – e.g., Basle 1 and 
2- as well as the strengthened supervision have not favored lending to SMEs. Financial 
repression has also prompted a sizable amount of research, which focuses on the role of financial 
development in giving a lift to economic activity by accelerating productivity, as well as by 
mobilizing savings.  
A large number of empirical studies have been undertaken on the relationship between 
financial development and growth and they have concluded that the relevant ratios measuring 
financial market development—e.g., private sector credit /gross domestic product (GDP); stock 
market capitalization /GDP, and total stock market value traded/GDP and M2/GDP—are 
positively correlated with both growth rates of GDP. 
Financial Liberalization and Financial Crises 
Stability and financial crises represent the other side of financial liberalization. 
Opponents of financial liberalization argue that it would lead to financial crises (Caprio and 
Summers24; Stiglitz25). The opening of the current account may favor excessive borrowing—at 
                                                 
20 S.A. Claessens, Demirgüc-Kunt and H. Huizinga, “How does Foreign Entry Affect Domestic Banking Markets?” 
Journal of Banking and Finance 25: 891–91, 2001. 
21 George R. Clarke, Robert Cull, Maria Soledad Martinez Peria and Susana M. Sánchez.  “Bank Lending to Small 
Businesses in Latin America. Does Bank Origin Matter?” In Policy Research Working Paper 2760. 2002, 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
22 Ramon Moreno and Augustin Villar. 2004. “The Increased Role of Foreign Bank Entry in Emerging Markets”, 
BIS Paper 23, 2004, Basel: Bank for International Settlements. 
23 José Mauro Morais, “Credito bancario no Brasil: Participacao das pequeñas empresas e condicoes de acesso”. 
Productive Development Paper 168, 2005, Santiago: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
24 G. Caprio and L. Summers. “Finance and Its Reform: Beyond Laissez-Faire”, Policy Research Working Paper 
1171, 1993, Washington DC: World Bank. 
25 .J. E. Stiglitz, “The Role of the State in Financial Markets”, in Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference 
on Development Economics, ed. M. Bruno and B. Pleskovic. Washington: World Bank and “Capital Market 
Liberalization, Economic Growth and Instability”, in World Development 28: 1075–86, 2000. 
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both the government and corporate levels—at an initial overvalued exchange rate (e.g., 
Argentina in the 1990s) that, if it cannot be sustained with growth, will prompt a financial crisis 
in which the excessive borrowing has to be repaid at a devaluated exchange rate. Glick and 
Hutchinson26 argue that banking and currencies crises constitute a phenomenon that is 
concentrated in financially liberalized emerging markets and does appear to emerge in advanced 
economies. In this respect, they suggest that banking crises provide leading information about 
the possibility of currency crises (i.e., foreign exchange), while currency crises do not constitute 
a leading indicator of banking crises. Following the previous literature, Glick and Hutchinson27  
suggest that currency devaluation is a rational policy option to reduce bank runs in a country 
with a fixed exchange rate; and that bank crises are prompted by moral hazard, financial 
liberalization that makes foreign borrowing easier, and large macroeconomic shocks, e.g., a 
crash in assets prices. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, following widespread financial liberalization, several industrial 
and emerging market countries witnessed financial fragility and crises. In Chile, in 1981, 
banking sector problems emerged shortly after the financial sector was deregulated. Argentina—
a country that had undertaken far-reaching financial liberalization measures—in 2001 faced one 
of the most devastating financial crises in its history. 
Evaluation of Financial Liberalization 
 While the predominant view is that financial liberalization—i.e., the removal of 
government intervention in the financial markets—spurs economic development and growth, an 
alternative analysis is taken against neoliberal policies and financial liberalization (see 
Eichengreen28). Stiglitz29  argues that endemic information asymmetries in the financial markets 
will not be solved by financial liberalization. Stallings and Studart30  look at the ownership of 
banks (including foreign banks), performance, and institutions—not otherwise defined—and 
assert that the performance of the banking sector and of public sector banks, particularly in Latin 
America,31 depends on the strength of institutions. Crotty and Lee32, and Singh and Weisse33 , 
refer to the South Korean experience. They argue that the economic and neoliberal reforms—
undertaken in South Korea both before and after the 1997 crises—have replaced the traditional 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
26 Reuven Glick and Michael Hutchinson, “Banking and Currency Crises: How Common are Twins?” Paper 
presented at Pacific Basin Conference, 1999, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
27 Reuven Glick, and Michael Hutchinson, op. cit. 
28 Barry Eichengreen, “Capital Flows and Crises”, Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2004. 
29 J. Stiglitz, Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth and Instability, op. cit. 
30 Barbara Stallings with Rogerio Studart, “Finance for Development”, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
2006.  
31 “Public banks can perform well according to commonly used indicators – but only if the country institutional 
framework is strong” (Stallings with Studart 2006, 80). 
32 James Crotty and Kang-Kook Lee, “Economic Performance in Post-Crisis Korea: A Critical Perspective of Neo-
Liberal Restructuring”, Working Paper 23, Political Economy Research Institute, Economics Department, 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Also Seoul Economic Journal, 14, no. 2, 2001, Summer: 183–242 and “Is 
Financial Liberalization Good for Developing Countries? The Case of South Korea in the 1990s” in Review of 
Radical Political Economy, 2001, 34: 327–34. 
33 Ajit Singh and B.A. Weisse, “Emerging Stock Markets, Portfolio Capital Flows and Long-Term Economic 
Growth: Micro and Macroeconomic Perspectives”. World Development 26, 1998, no. 4: 607–22. 
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South Korean model of a state-led, bank-based financial system, leading to financial 
restructuring with continuous corporate problems and a declining rate of capital accumulation. 
An alternative strategy of a reform of state-led, banks-based growth that is thoroughly 
democratized would have left the South Korean economy better off. This approach is advocated 
for other emerging market countries.  
A number of factors influence the fragility of the financial system, e.g., macroeconomic 
and fiscal policies, vulnerability to balance-of-payments crises, the flexibility of factors of 
production, and particularly labor markets. Financial liberalization has a negative impact on the 
stability of the banking sector, and the magnitude of this effect depends on the other weaknesses 
in the economy, including those mentioned above.  
 Under these circumstances, a solid regulatory and supervisory environment (Stiglitz34)—
particularly for the banking sector—mitigates the effects of financial liberalization, for example, 
by putting constraints on lending to already-overleveraged corporations and preventing moral 
hazard. The legal environment—e.g., effective law enforcement, transparency and disclosure, an 
efficient bureaucracy, and negligible corruption—can contain the adverse effects of liberalization 
on the financial system.  
 These considerations lead to the policy recommendation that the objective of financial 
sector development should be pursued following some sequencing (see World Bank35, 2005, 
chapter 12). In that context, macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal discipline, as well as labor 
market reform, should be initiated before financial liberalization is implemented. By the same 
token, strong and independent banking supervision of financial intermediaries should accompany 
financial liberalization (Karacadag, Sundararajan, and Elliott36 ) 
 Given that institutions require time to make effective changes and adjust to them, 
financial liberalization process should be considered in the context of an overall strategy for 
domestic financial market development and should be gradual. Policymakers may weigh the 
positive effects of liberalization on financial development and economic growth against the 
negative effects of a banking crisis. In this respect, an improper sequence of reforms can lead to 
banking and debt crises and to disintermediation, thus undoing the potential benefits on the side 
of economic growth.  
 Research seems to suggest that countries coming from a background of financial 
repression have greater gains on the front of financial development and growth that surpass the 
losses from possible financial crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache37). The “gradualist” 
approach to reform has to be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the 
                                                 
34 Stiglitz, Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth and Instability, op. cit. 
35 World Bank, “Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook”, World Bank Publications, Washington DC, 2005. 
36 Cem Karacadag, V. Sundararajan and Jennifer Elliott. ” Managing Risks in Financial Market Development: The 
Role of Sequencing”, IMF Working Paper No. 03/116, International Monetary Fund 2003, Washington, DC. 
Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03116.pdf. 
37 Asli Demirgüç- and Enrica Detragiache,” Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility”, Paper presented at 
Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, April 20–21 1998. 
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political economy of the country and to what extent a gradual process of reform can be 
captured—or reversed—by those who would suffer most from the financial liberalization.  
 
Financial Liberalization and Domestic Financial Markets 
Financial liberalization is also expected to discipline excessive dependence on foreign 
capital flows by developing domestic financial markets. This “requirement” has   caught some 
attention of researchers and policymakers in the process of financial liberalization.38 Research 
has been looking at financial liberalization as a positive for economic growth and as a risk for 
crisis. Kose and others39 show that developing countries benefit from financial liberalization 
with many nuances and that financial liberalization and globalization do not lead to financial 
crises. As these scholars point out, there are many more nuances, which they call collateral 
benefits, and there are also “threshold conditions,” above which financial globalization is leading 
to increased productivity and growth (s 40ee IMF ).  
                                                
IMF argues,“over the medium term—a more developed domestic financial 
market increases the volume and helps reduce the volatility of capital flows to 
emerging markets. Specifically, the estimation results find that, although growth 
is the primary determinant of the level of capital inflows, equity market liquidity 
and financial openness also help attract capital inflows. Moreover, financial 
openness is associated with lower capital inflow volatility. These results, which 
are consistent with the views expressed by institutional investors, point to the 
advantages of focusing on the medium-term goal of improving the quality of 
domestic financial markets. By adopting such a focus, emerging market countries 
will be in a better position to maximize the benefits of capital inflows while 
dealing with their potential volatility.” 
 The main reason for financial liberalization is to allow market forces to operate and 
create the conditions for an integrated global financial market, which nurtures a solid domestic 
financial market.41 While embarking on financial liberalization in the 1990s, most countries-- 
and particularly those in Latin America—were still heavily relying on external savings and 
external borrowing rather than the long-term market in domestic currency. In fact, capital 
account convertibility allowed companies and banks to borrow in foreign currency—following 
the encouragement of lenders who thought they would get out before the crisis struck, if 
 
38 See Cifuentes, Desormeaux, and Gonzalez, “Capital Markets in Chile: from Financial Repression to Financial 
Deepening.” BIS Paper 11. 2002, Basel: Bank for International Settlements for the Chilean experience with 
liberalization and domestic capital market development. 
39 M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff and Shang-Jin Wei. “Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal”. 
IMF Working Paper WP/06/189. 2006, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
40 IMF, “Global Financial Stability Report, Financial Market Turbulence. Causes, Consequences, and  Policies, 
October, World Economic Financial Surveys, 2007, IMF Washington DC,  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2007/02/pdf/text.pdf, IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, Containing 
Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness 2008a April, IMF Washington DC IMF Global Financial 
Stability Report GFSR Market Update, 2008b, IMF Washington DC. 
41 See Feldstein and Horioka, “Domestic Savings and International Capital Flows”, in the Economic Journal, 314-
29, 1980. 
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conditions worsened. Most of the banking lending was short term, and the bond market—both 
for government and corporations—was nonexistent.  
Domestic Currency and Capital Markets 
The crises of Mexico in 1994–95, the East Asian meltdown of 1997, and the subsequent 
crises in Russia and Latin America (i.e., in Argentina and to a lesser extent Brazil) have exposed 
the balance sheet weaknesses due to currency mismatches as  “countries cannot borrow abroad in 
their own currencies, a fact that we refer to as “original sin.”42  
 Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill43  suggest a “self-financing” ratio as a measure of the 
financing of the domestic capital stock; i.e., a ratio of 1 means that the domestic capital stock is 
entirely financed domestically. These researchers also find evidence that emerging market 
countries with a higher self-financing ratio (e.g., Asian countries) grew faster than countries with 
a low self-financing ratio (e.g., Latin America) relying on foreign sources.  
 In the last several years, and focusing particularly on the Latin America and the 
Caribbean region,44 there has been a significant improvement of external and internal 
macroeconomic and fiscal conditions, especially in the management of government debt. Several 
indicators—external debt service as a proportion of exports or interest payments, public debt as a 
proportion of tax revenues, public debt as a proportion of GDP—point in the positive direction. 
Under these circumstances, and following the lessons of the crises of the late 1990s early 2000s, 
Latin American countries—like Asian countries—show a strong commitment to develop 
domestic financial markets in domestic currency with long-term tenure and to increase the self-
financing ratio.45  
 According to the Bank for International Settlements, domestic bond markets for 
government debt have grown substantially in selected countries and in Latin America, i.e., the 
outstanding stock exceeds, in 2006, US$ 4 trillions compared with 2US$ 1 trillion of 1995 (see 
Committee on the Global Financial System, 2007, pp.2-3). Domestic debt issued by the seven 
largest countries in the region increased by 166 percent during the period 1995–2005, reaching 
the level of $850 billion.46 Short-term debt of the public sector in domestic currency has 
declined, but it is still high (about 45 percent for the region overall) and is therefore exposed to 
various risks: exchange rate, interest rate, and inflation. However, several emerging market 
countries—particularly those that are more advanced—have made substantial progress in 
                                                 
42Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann, “Original Sin: The Road to Redemption” Washington DC: Research 
Department, Inter-American Development Bank, 2003. 
43 J.B. Aizenman, Pinto, and A. Radziwill, “Sources for Financing of Domestic Capital: Is Foreign Savings a Viable 
Option for Developing Countries” NBER Working Paper 10624. 2004, Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
44 With respect to Asia, following the crises, the financial authorities in the Asian countries affected by the crisis 
(e.g., Thailand) took severe measures to redress the unbalance of the financial system, giving priority to the 
development of domestic bond market. 
45 The reasoning along the line of the self-financing ratio is equivalent to the argument of Stiglitz (2000, 1080–82) 
that borrowing abroad implies a high cost for developing countries. The lack of viable domestic capital markets 
could strengthen the “developmental view” arguing that the government—and public sector banks—would be the 
right policy to assure a self-financing ratio close of 1.  
46 For Asia, the rise for the same period is around 400 percent. 
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developing their domestic government bond markets with longer maturities. Solid government 
yield curves—nominal and also liquid—of up to 20 years- exist in many countries in Asia and 
Latin America (e.g., Colombia, South Korea, Thailand, Mexico, and Brazil).47 Countries have 
reduced currency and maturity mismatches and moved out of U.S. dollar liabilities and toward 
longer-term, domestic, and increasingly fixed maturities in domestic markets, reducing the 
vulnerability associated with refinancing risk. Standard and Poor’s,48 for instance, indicates that 
the better ratings for Chile (January 2004), Brazil (September 2004), and Mexico (January 2005) 
were positively influenced by the proportional increase of the ratio of financing in domestic 
currency to total debt—i.e., debt in foreign currency declined. 
Overall, as the Committee on the Global Financial System indicates local currency bond 
markets helps financial stability. 
 Cifuentes, Desormeaux, and Gonzalez and Jeanneau and Verdia49 offer substantial 
contributions for the cases of Chile and Mexico, respectively, about the passage from financial 
repression to more complete financial markets.  
Although the excess borrowing of government remains a problem and a significant part 
of government paper is still short term, the control of inflation, fiscal discipline, and stable and 
predictable macroeconomic policies represent noteworthy achievements in many emerging 
market countries. Under these circumstances, emerging market countries’ government bonds are 
of increasing interest to foreign investors, who buy such countries’ global and domestic issues. 
Vulnerabilities still exist in connection with the significant portion of debt denominated 
in foreign currencies, and with the large short-term share of public debt. Also, a devaluation of 
the domestic currency50 would prompt an increase in interest rates and in the cost of debt in 
domestic currency and a decline in the prices of government paper. These vulnerabilities are 
even more significant if we consider that an increasingly large portion of domestic debt is sold to 
foreign investors, who would react negatively (e.g., by selling the government paper) in case of 
incipient crises and thus exacerbate problems. 
Domestic Currency Financing and the Banking Sector 
The impact of the increased use of the domestic currency on financial stability deserves 
increased attention also in relation to the differential treatment that the new Basel II capital 
establishes for banks with respect to exposure in domestic or foreign currency. This is also 
important for the rating agencies, which normally assign better ratings to credits in domestic 
currency than in foreign currency. 
Financial strengthening is evident in many emerging market countries and particularly in 
Latin American countries. This improved situation derives from the reforms undertaken, 
                                                 
47 Market trading in domestic bonds is still low (e.g., $152 billion for Mexico, which is the highest).  
48 “The Importance of Going Local: Shifting Away from Foreign Currency Sovereign Debt in Latin America,” 
Sovereign Ratings in Latin America, Standard and Poor’s, September 2005.  
49 Cifuentes, Desormeaux, and Gonzalez, op. cit. and Serge Jeanneau and Camillo Towar, “Domestic Bond Markets 
in Latin America: Achievements and Challenges”, BIS Quarterly Review, June, 2006. 
50 Many emerging countries benefit from a consistently high price of commodities.  
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especially in the regulatory and supervision environment undertaken at global and national 
levels, e.g., observance of Basel I and II, the Financial Action Task Force, the International 
Financial Reporting Standards, and the Core Principles for Banking Supervision, as well as 
International Organization of Securities Commissions principles and the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program. Balance sheet and market indicators are positive, and asset quality, 
profitability, and loan loss coverage improved.  
 On average, the financial soundness indicators for many emerging market countries are 
good and comparable to those in industrial economies. For instance, for Latin America, in 2005, 
nonperforming loans were at the level of 5 percent; the return on assets for banks was 1.9 
percent, and the return on equity was 18.6 percent.51 However, on average, financial 
intermediation in the Latin American and Caribbean countries is stagnating, and bank 
intermediation is low compared to that in other regions: 
                                                        M2/GDP (percent) Private loans/GDP (percent) 
        Latin America     35.4   25.1 
       Advanced economies   111.2                86.1 
       Selected emerging markets   89.5   90.0  
 
In 2007, some of these indicators have improved for selected emerging markets. 
Moreover, the interest rate spread—on average—in Latin America and the Caribbean is about 6 
percent, while it is 3 percent in Europe and 2 percent in Asia. 
In addition, the Latin American and Caribbean region has not so far witnessed a solid 
long-term capital market development in domestic currency, which is much more under way in 
Asia than in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2007, stock market capitalization in selected 
Asian countries represents almost 100% of GDP, while in Latin America remains below 60%. 
Several countries still depend on long-term external financing. In turn, this may spin a recession 
and a deterioration of payments of the public and private sectors, affecting the willingness and 
ability to pay as well as the ratings assigned. Moreover, a large part of the population in Latin 
America and the Caribbean does not have access to financial services. 
 The development of domestic financial currency as a primary source of financing is 
expected to open lending opportunities for banks, improve access to finance, and have a crucial 
impact on the improvement of the ability to pay that would reinforce the financial systems. An 
advance in this direction would favor the implementation of Basel II52, generating more efficient 
financial markets. 
                                                 
51See David Marston, “Preconditions for a Sound Financial Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Paper 
presented at Conference on Risk Management and Supervision, International Monetary Fund, Washington, June 30, 
2006. .  
52 The Federal Reserve Board of  the United States defines Basel II as an effort by international banking supervisors 
to update the original international bank capital accord (Basel I), which has been in effect since 1988. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, on which the United States serves as a participating member, developed 
Basel II. The revised accord aims to improve the consistency of capital regulations internationally, make regulatory 
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 With respect to sovereign and interbank exposures, the need for capital would be 
reduced. Banks would have more incentives to lend to a large array of clients and deepen the 
financial system. From the point of view of the exposure of the private sector, a positive impact 
is that in the case of the depreciation of the domestic currency, debtors would not be exposed to a 
deterioration in the domestic currency and thus a deterioration in the indicators of solvency (e.g., 
the ability to pay could even be improved at the aggregate level).  
 Under these circumstances, financial systems would be less exposed to traditional 
systemic crises. Unfavorable international conditions (e.g., falling prices of primary goods) 
would have an impact on the exchange rate and domestic interest rates. Fiscal discipline, public 
debt management, and a prudent monetary policy will be necessary for consolidating 
macroeconomic stability and avoiding bank runs in the case of a crisis. Under these new 
circumstances, it is conceivable that the domestic financial system would face cases of banking 
insolvency rather than generalized crises that can be solved according to the Basel II 
prescriptions of more capital aligned with the risks, better management and supervision of these 
risks, and safety nets such as deposit insurance.  
 An improvement in sovereign risk can generate more appetite for this type of risk with 
respect to the private sector. Again, this danger has to be mitigated with a fiscal policy that leads 
to a reduction of the fiscal deficit. An improvement in the business climate would permit the 
further development of domestic currency and an extension of long-term financing. In turn, an 
improved profile for sovereign risk will ease the migration toward Basel II in emerging market 
countries. 
 
Financial Stability and Reforms 
 The International Monetary Fund’s 2007 Report on Global Financial Stability stresses 
that improving the domestic financial systems of emerging market countries implies a greater 
integration of these countries with the global financial system.53 This assessment is confirmed in 
the 2008 Report and its update (IMF2008a and IMF 2008b). Thus, in a more integrated system, 
not only does the correlation of returns increase, but the risk also increases that crises could erupt 
at any point in the system. This has been the case with the subprime housing mortgage crisis that 
started in United States and then spread to other markets. 
 The IMF Report stresses that the strengthened domestic markets of emerging market 
countries—particularly for those more advanced markets that have undertaken reforms—allow 
these nations to withstand the financial turbulence that is a global consequence of the lack of 
credit discipline. Overall, the risks in emerging markets remain finely balanced, with many 
countries benefiting from improved macroeconomic fundamentals, stronger policymaking 
frameworks, reduced external sovereign debt, and better-managed debt structures. 
                                                                                                                                                             
capital more risk sensitive, and promote enhanced risk-management practices among large, internationally active 
banking organizations. 
53 This section draws heavily on the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues 
(Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2007), 
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2007/01/pdf/text.pdf and also on the 2008 report and its update (see 
references) 
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The IMF Report empirically analyzes whether, in addition to strong macroeconomic 
fundamentals, a well-functioning domestic financial market encourages capital inflows and 
reduces these flows’ volatility over the medium term. The Report uses a panel estimation 
technique to examine the factors that determine the volume and volatility of annual capital 
inflows for a sample of developed and emerging market economies from 1977 to 2006. These 
factors include financial variables, such as equity market depth and liquidity and financial 
openness, and a smaller sample also includes institutional quality variables, such as corporate 
governance quality and accounting standards.  
 The key results from the IMF Report’s estimations are as follows: 
• Growth and growth prospects are the primary domestic determinants of the level of 
capital inflows. 
• Financial market liquidity and financial openness help attract capital inflows. 
• Greater financial openness is associated with lower capital volatility.  
• The volatility of capital inflows is partly driven by external factors, such as global 
financial liquidity, which are outside the control of emerging markets. 
• Institutional quality, as measured by a number of diverse indicators, is important. 
Specifically, better corporate governance is associated with a higher level of inflows, 
and several indicators of institutional quality and sound market infrastructure, 
including regulatory quality and the rule of law, are positively associated with a 
reduction in the volatility of capital inflows.  
The results of the IMF’s empirical work show that in addition to strong macroeconomic 
fundamentals, including sound fiscal policy and more flexible exchange rates, the liquidity of 
equity markets within a regulated financial system and financial openness positively influence 
the level of capital inflows and capital flows volatility.   
 As is shown by the current financial crisis, which is related to the lack of credit discipline 
in mature markets—that is, the U.S. subprime mortgage market and leveraged market—
prudential measures and the quality of supervision remain crucial.54 In this respect, emerging 
market countries that have undertaken significant reforms can endure these types of crises and 
the subsequent “flight to quality.”  
 The IMF Report also outlines a series of recommendations to ensure that the financial 
system can withstand major shocks: 
(i) Prudential measures in banking could focus on making sure that banks understand the 
risks stemming from capital inflows, that the banks’ capital structures are appropriate 
for these types of inflows, and that financial institutions develop proper risk 
                                                 
54 According to Alan Greenpsan, “The current financial crisis in the United States is likely to be judged in retrospect 
as the most wrenching since the end of the Second World War.” Financial Times, March 16, 2006.  
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management policies and practices to measure and manage aggregate exposures, 
including the offshore exposure of domestic financial institutions.  
(ii) There should be guidance to promote a good understanding of risk among borrowers, 
in particular for loans involving foreign exchange, for which the exchange rate risk 
for borrowers can easily translate into credit risk for banks. 
(iii) Prudential measures concerned with the capital markets should aim to strengthen 
corporate governance, including shareholders’ rights, listing requirements, and the 
clearance and settlement system.  
(iv) Margin requirements may be established that consider such factors as historical 
volatility, the risks of extreme movements, the length of the settlement period, and the 
capital adequacy of brokers. These parameters are most effectively established to 
promote systemic development and stability in the long run, rather than as a short-
term response to capital movements. 
(v) The easing of controls on capital outflows would reduce pressures from large capital 
inflows.55 The long-term trend toward increased financial integration is such that 
countries will need to put themselves in a situation that will make it possible to live 
with the potential volatility of capital flows. Financial policies that consider the 
longer term will aid countries in this endeavour. 
(vi) Analysis has demonstrated the importance of transparency in relation to both 
financial policies—macroeconomic and microeconomic—and data. When 
transparency is combined with a strong self-assessment of macroeconomic and 
financial vulnerabilities and with sound risk management systems for both financial 
institutions and the public sector, countries gain an improved ability to deal with 
capital flows.56  
It is difficult to make broad recommendations beyond the ones noted above, because the 
policy challenges associated with capital inflows cannot and should not be uniform and the 2008 
Report of the IMF and its update (IMF 2008a, IMF 2008b) stress that different situations exist in 
emerging countries. Countries differ in their exchange rate regimes and the type of capital 
inflows they experience, and therefore in the challenges they face. They differ also in the depth 
                                                 
55 A number of countries—including Brazil, Chile, China, and South Korea—have recently liberalized rules limiting 
individual or institutional investments abroad. This has led to a rapid increase in portfolio investment outflows, 
especially in Asia. It is too early to conclude from the data whether the liberalization of capital outflows will be 
effective in relieving inflow pressure over time. It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of this liberalization, 
given the possible role of other factors in determining the direction and level of capital flows. There are also 
indications that in past episodes of capital inflow surges, the liberalization of capital outflows was matched by larger 
inflows; see Carmen M. Reinhart and Vincent R. Reinhart, Capital Inflows and Reserve Accumulation: The Recent 
Evidence, NBER Working Paper 13842 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13842.pdf. In line with the earlier empirical results suggesting that financial openness 
encourages inflows, it is the case that capital controls, broadly defined, are usually not helpful in managing inflows.  
56 Private institutional investors have repeatedly noted the importance of timely and accurate data, as well as a 
predictable and transparent way of communicating with the investor base, as factors that contribute to the effective 
management of capital flows. 
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and diversification of their financial markets and their stage of institutional and regulatory 
development, which means that they have a different menu of policy options at their disposal.  
However, it is possible to offer several general guidelines for financial sector policies that 
can alleviate the pressures arising from large capital inflows:  
• Loosening or eliminating restrictions on residents’ capital outflows is a tool that can 
ease pressures from large capital inflows. Outward investment will also lead to the 
internationalisation of capital across emerging markets and, therefore, can be a 
welcome means of risk diversification. More experience will show whether this 
policy will have a lasting effect.  
• Supervisory and prudential measures have a key role to play in addressing the health 
and stability of the financial system. Ideally, however, they are best used to address 
prudential considerations, such as rapid credit growth or unhedged foreign exchange 
exposures—that is, to ensure the soundness of the domestic financial system, rather 
than as a response designed to alleviate pressures stemming from capital inflow 
surges. A well-supervised financial system will help provide safeguards that will 
permit capital flows to enter and exit the financial system without endangering 
financial stability.  
• Capital controls should be used only as a last resort and as part of a package of 
macroeconomic and prudential measures. Under certain circumstances, they may be 
able to decelerate short-term speculative inflows, especially if the infrastructure is 
already in place. In addition to the challenge of effectiveness, reputational costs ought 
to be considered. Moreover, the effectiveness of controls can either be circumvented 
from the start or diminish over time, because financial instruments will likely be 
found to circumvent them.  
Ultimately, the IMF Report concludes that it is the quality of an emerging market’s 
domestic financial market—in addition to strong macroeconomic performance—that will put it in 
a position to maximize the benefits of capital inflows and enable it to best deal with their potential 
volatility. These considerations are confirmed in the Global Financial Stability Report of April 
2008 (IMF, 2008a) and in the most recent 2008 Market Update (IMF, 2008b), which indicates that 
Emerging Markets (EM) remain relatively resilient to the credit turmoil thus far. Due to improved 
fundamentals, abundant reserves, and strong growth. Some concerns remain with respect to the 
tightening of credit, balance sheets contractions, emerging corporate credit risks vulnerability of 
financial institutions, exchange rate volatility, and financial contagion related to the crisis of sub-
prime. However, as the crisis remains protracted, external funding conditions are tightening, and 
some emerging markets are coming under increased scrutiny, especially regarding their policies to 
address rising inflationary pressures. Short-term measures intended for the immediate relief of 
pressure from large capital inflows may have uncertain effectiveness or unintended side effects, or 
be a distraction from the long-term goal of raising the quality of the domestic market—including 
the quality of its depth and liquidity, market infrastructure, supervision, and institutions. The past 
decade’s increasing integration of financial markets—across both countries and sectors—has both 
long-term and cyclical elements. However, even after the current cycle turns, the underlying trend 
toward financial globalisation is likely to point to continued financial integration, which will 
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affect both advanced and newly arriving emerging market countries. Therefore, these countries 
will be best served if their primary response to today’s large capital inflows is to pursue the 
longer-term goal of developing their financial markets and building up resilience to capital 
volatility, rather than making short-term responses to inflow surges. Countries will be better off if 
flows can both enter and exit freely without disrupting domestic financial stability and the real 
economy.  In other words, the best defence to the fragility of global financial markets and the 
possibility of a systemic risk, which exercise stress on the banks’ balance sheets, falling equity 
prices of banks, slowdown of the real economy and decline in economic growth rests with a solid 
and well supervised domestic financial system. 
  
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations  
From the review of studies and researches on the topics of stability, growth, liberalization 
and access to finance emerge a series of considerations.  
At present, the situation can be generally characterized that while countries in the Latin 
American and Caribbean region have made significant progresses in monetary policy, debt 
management and government borrowing, supervision, prudential and risk based regulation, and 
the level of interest rates is low, corporations’ financing on domestic capital markets is still 
relatively thin; and individuals and even companies with acceptable fundamentals are left out of 
financial markets. There are some positive signs,57 but large and strong corporations issue bonds 
abroad, which aggravate the drain of resources from domestic capital markets and also possibly 
lead to negative social welfare of the type that Stiglitz58 identified.  
The main challenges for policy makers lay on how to create room for continuing the 
efforts towards efficient domestic financial markets integrated in the global system.  Those 
markets should be mainly geared towards financing the productive sector and growth-generating 
activities while also providing access to credit without determining crowding out by the 
government and thus deepening the financial system.  
 In a broader context, the challenge is how to develop modern financial systems with the 
institutional function of converting some uncertainty into quantifiable risk, allowing access to 
finance at all levels while favoring initiatives that are oriented to produce growth and not only 
income.  
 Responsible monetary policies should continue to keep the levels of inflation low.59 
Fiscal frameworks still need to be strengthened, e.g., government debt management maintained 
as a significant component of fiscal discipline60. The effectiveness of the institutional settings 
                                                 
57 Corporate bond issuance has expanded since 2002 in Latin America and the Caribbean, even though bond 
issuance is restricted to few companies. Structured finance, e.g., securitization, has emerged in various countries 
(e.g., Colombia, Brazil).  However, following the crisis of sub-prime the securitization deals are on retreat. 
58 Stiglitz, Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth and Instability, op. cit. 
59 Inflation in the region, on average, declined from 263 percent (1990–94) to 6.3 percent (2005).  
60 Agustin Carstens, Transcript of an IMF Center Book Forum, “Pragmatism: Latin America New’s “Ism”? 
International Monetary Fund, May 2006. 
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should be completed.  On the banking and capital market front: accelerating the introduction of 
the “preconditions” to Basel II (e.g., principles of supervision), improving the efficiency of bank 
financial intermediation, and resuming the development of capital markets.  
Several emerging countries and also the Latin America and Caribbean region uniquely 
favorable external conditions—including the price of raw materials, low interest rates, and a 
series of positive outcomes deriving from the reforms of the 1990s (e.g., the strengthening of 
legal and regulatory frameworks, fiscal consolidation, and financial liberalization)61—provide a 
distinctive opportunity for the continuation of the financial sector reform. If the overall strategy 
and sensible policies—including extensive credit information, a solid supervisory framework and 
capacity, strong disclosure provisions supported by adequate accounting standards, and increased 
market discipline— continue to be put in place, we may see that “collateral benefits and 
threshold conditions” to which Kose and others62  refer would provide a better path to financial 
sector development and that the trade-offs of financial liberalization—growth and stability—
would lose much of their effect.  
 The reforms undertaken have made many emerging economies less vulnerable to 
financial disruption derived from external factors, such as the crises of subprime lending in the 
United States. The establishment of government benchmarks and the market infrastructure 
should constitute the additional conditions for the expansion of lending, for reducing the 
crowding out of the private sector by the government, and for establishing healthy financial 
markets. However, domestic financing is still shallow, and while government financial needs 
tend to be satisfied on the domestic markets, solid private companies tap the global markets, e.g., 
still using securitization vehicles. Under these circumstances, a reverse of the existing favorable 
international conditions could set the stage for financial and economic crises that would mostly 
hit private companies.  
 The governments in emerging countries and in the Latin American and Caribbean region 
understand the trade-offs here and are in a position to continue on a more comprehensive 
strategy for domestic financial market development.63  
 This effort also implies that the financial intermediation of banks would be put on the 
same level playing field in terms of supervision, regulation, and other regulatory requirements. It 
would also call for transparency and independent corporate governance. In terms of the price of 
loans, the interest rate charged would be in line with risk/reward criteria, and therefore no 
subsidy or below-market interest rate. Under these rules, public sector banks would not be 
eliminated, but they would be required to operate in a competitive environment and would be 
                                                 
61 Vulnerabilities are still relevant because global conditions could change; the oil market could tighten and affect 
partner country growth; non-oil commodity prices are projected to soften after 2007. 
62 Kose et al. Financial Globalization, op. cit. 
63 Eichengreen and Hausmann (2003, 30–31) argue: “The evidence is strong that original sin will not go away 
anytime soon as a result of the standard recipe of macroeconomic prudence and institution building. Efforts to 
strengthen national policies and institutions will help, but they will suffice to ameliorate the problem over the 
horizon relevant for practical policy decisions. And even if some countries do succeed in achieving redemption from 
original sin through initiatives taken at the domestic level, they will only raise the bar for the others, insofar as the 
addition of one more currency to the global portfolio reduces the diversification benefits of adding yet another.” 
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expected to concentrate on those areas and sectors (e.g., rural areas, and poor people) that do not 
have access to credit.  
Access to finance remains a significant issue and has the potential of being in 
contradiction with the aim of stability. However, a serious drive to access to credit not only has a 
substantial social and political impact, but also reduces the pro-cyclicality effect of Basle 2 rules. 
In this vein microfinance – including insurance -should be regarded as a sound policy and 
practice that allow a democratization of finance as well as social and economic benefits. This is a 
sector in which the public sector – including funds and state owned institutions- can play an 
important role without threatening the stability of the system, i.e., banks and financial institutions 
can operate and provide support while not increasing their risks. This is an area where market 
failures exist and the fine line is between activities that generate growth and activities that 
generate income. The financing of both types of activities might be necessary, but the key is to 
find a correct mix avoiding an excessive financing exclusively directed -for social reasons- to 
activities that generate income and constitute a replica of what is already existing without 
innovation, which in turn may lead to a flat economy without productivity gains and thus growth. 
This also implies a cultural shift that would lead banks to lend more based on the merit of the 
projects than on the existence of guarantees.   
On the other hand, while this strategy applies to selected emerging countries, a different 
and more complex challenge remain for those economies that have not reached a satisfactory 
level of an efficient and effective financial sector. Thus, a two-tier country remains a major 
feature particularly in Latin America, with some countries well advanced and sophisticated while 
other at an initial stage of effective financial sector. 
 In the context of financial system development, the multilateral development banks – 
MDBs- such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) have worked intensively on the 
development of a sound and safe domestic financial system. In the last few years, MDBs have 
not only been an issuer of local currency debt but also a promoter of domestic bond markets. The 
conditions required for issuance by multilateral lenders do not really differ from those of 
multinational corporations or governments. However, countries wishing to develop their 
domestic markets are able to use multilateral lenders as catalysts in addressing the impediments 
constraining the development of their markets and as partners in improving market 
infrastructure. In this context, MDBs offer support in a number of areas, including in the 
underwriting and market making of local currency securities, e.g., the IDB has assisted with 18 
such issues in the past two years and also facilitates the issuance of securities by offering partial 
guarantees to private sector borrowers.  
 
 
 
